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Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining?
A Test Using Dual Jobholders
Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Mas, Rafaele Saggio, and Stephen A. Woodbury
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n We propose a test to
distinguish between wage
posting and wage bargaining.
n Using dual jobholders in
Washington State, we estimate
the sensitivity of wages and
separation rates to wage
shocks in a secondary job, our
measure of outside option.
n In lower parts of the
wage distribution, improved
outside options lead to higher
separations rates but not to
higher wages, consistent with
wage posting.
n In the highest wage quartile,
improved outside options lead
to higher wages, but not higher
separation rates, consistent
with bargaining.
n In the aggregate, bargaining
appears to be a limited
determinant of wage setting.
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How wages are set is a central question for
research on unemployment, business cycles, and
wage inequality. Two main frameworks for wage
setting are wage bargaining and wage posting.
Models of wage bargaining assume that workers
have the ability to negotiate compensation with
their employer, and that wages incorporate
information about an individual worker’s outside
option. Te alternative to bargaining is wage
posting, whereby an employer ofers a package of
compensation that the worker must take or leave.
Under wage posting, wages only respond to outside
options measured at the market level—changes
in an individual worker’s outside option have no
infuence.
Hall and Krueger (2010, 2012) obtained direct
evidence by surveying a representative sample of
newly hired workers in the United States and found
that one-third reported bargaining over pay before
accepting their position. Hall and Krueger’s work
stimulated several studies using observational data:
Faberman et al. (2017) found that workers who
could have stayed in their jobs before accepting
another position reported obtaining a higher
wage, and Lachowska (2017) found that workers’
subjective assessments of how easy it would be to
fnd an alternative job or to be replaced in their
current jobs are highly correlated with the wage
received in their current jobs. Tis early research
suggests a signifcant role for workers’ outside
options and bargaining in determining wages.
In this article, we summarize a diferent
approach to understanding the relative importance
of wage bargaining and wage posting. Te
approach is based on the experience of dual
jobholders observed in linked employer-employee
wage records from Washington State. We measure
the change in a dual jobholder’s outside option at
the primary job as the change in the average wage
of the worker’s coworkers in the secondary job.1 By
using this worker-specifc measure of the outside

option, we can estimate how primary-job wages
react to wage changes in secondary jobs while
controlling other changes afecting all workers at
the primary employer. Finding that primary-job
wages respond to wage changes in the secondary
job suggests wage bargaining; absence of a wage
response suggests wage posting.
To more clearly distinguish wage posting
from wage bargaining, we also examine whether

Individual wage bargaining occurs
only in the top one-fourth of the
wage distribution. For other workers,
wage setting is characterized by
wage posting, or take-it-or-leave-it
ofers by employers.
separations from the primary job are related to
wage changes in the secondary job. In a job where
wages are posted and not negotiable, we expect
workers to respond to a better outside option by
leaving the job for that option. In our setting, the
job ofering the better outside option is the dual
jobholder’s secondary job.
Who Leaves and Who Bargains?
Figure 1 shows how the distribution of dual
jobholding by industry in the sample we analyze
compares to the industry distribution of single
jobholders. Dual jobholding is concentrated in
service sectors—health care, accommodation
and food services, and retail trade—with these
industries roughly equally represented among
primary and secondary jobs. Workers in
manufacturing, information, and fnance and
insurance are less likely to be dual jobholders.
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Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining?

Using this sample of dual
jobholders, the analysis points to two
main fndings. First, changes in a
worker’s wage in the primary job are
only weakly relative to changes in the
wages of coworkers in the secondary
job. Overall, then, bargaining plays
a quite limited role in wage setting.

Consistent with previous research,
we fnd that employers limit work
hours on primary jobs, creating a
motive to moonlight for workers
who want additional income.
Rather, when wages on the secondary
job improve, workers tend to leave
the primary job for the secondary job.
Specifcally, a 10 percent increase in the
outside option leads to a 4 percentage
point increase in the probability

of transitioning to the job ofering
the better outside option. Given the
low baseline separation rates in our
sample, this estimate represents a large
increase.
Second, we fnd substantial
diferences in the prevalence of
bargaining and posting among diferent
groups of workers. Specifcally,
bargaining is more prevalent among
workers in the top 25 percent of the
wage distribution. For these highwage workers, better outside options
tend to result in higher wages on the
primary job rather than separation
and movement to the secondary
job. But for workers in the lowest 25
percent of the wage distribution, we
see no evidence of pay increases on the
primary job from improved outside
options. Instead, we see separation
from the primary job, consistent
with wage posting and an absence of
bargaining.

Figure 1: Where Do Dual Jobholders Work?
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NOTE: The fgure shows the proportion of single jobholders (black bars), of the primary job of dual jobholders
(red bars), and of the secondary job of dual jobholders (blue bars), by industry. Observations of single
jobholders and of dual jobholders’ primary jobs in educational services and public administration are omitted.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Washington State wage records.
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Figure 2 elaborates on this point,
showing that sectors of the economy
where improved outside options lead to
wage increases tend to be those where
improved outside options lead to fewer
separations. Specifcally, the horizontal
axis shows the estimated efect of a 1
percent improvement in the outside
option on the primary-job wages, while
the vertical axis shows the estimated
efect of a 1 percent improvement in
the outside option on the likelihood
of separating from the primary job
and moving to the secondary job.
As indicated by the dashed, best-ft
line, there is an inverse relationship:
following an improvement in workers’
outside options, employers either
negotiate with them for better pay or
the workers leave the employer for the
job ofering the better outside option.
For example, in fnance and insurance,
employers tend to respond to improved
outside options by negotiating a higher
wage. In contrast, in health care and
accommodation and food services,
improved outside options tend to lead
to a separation.
Efects of Changes in Hours on the
Primary Job
Te data also allow us to study how
wage changes in one job afect hours
worked in the other jobs. Tis feature
helps us understand why workers
choose to moonlight. Tere are two
results. First, we fnd that work hours
with the primary jobs are insensitive
to the changes in the worker’s outside
option. Tis is consistent with a
simple model, outlined in the working
paper, where workaholics face limits
on the hours they can work in their
primary jobs and take a second job for
extra income. In other words, people
moonlight because they want extra
income and their main jobs do not let
them add hours.
Second, we fnd moderate, but
signifcant, efects of wage changes in
a worker’s primary job and the hours
worked on the secondary job. Because

EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH • JANUARY 2022

Conclusions
Our fndings show that wage
posting is a common feature of the
labor market, and that separation is
the main response to improved outside
options, particularly for low-wage
workers. On the other hand, wage
bargaining is not as prevalent in the
data, except perhaps when considering
higher-wage workers.
Our approach to measuring the
outside options of individual workers
can be applied to any setting with
linked employer-employee data
and multiple jobholders. However,
the results may not generalize to
groups of dual jobholders working
in nonstandard work arrangements.
Tese nonstandard arrangements
include electronically mediated “gig”
jobs and other independent contractor
positions that are not currently covered
by administrative wage records. Future
research may answer whether these
workers have little power to negotiate
wages or whether they bargain over
wages.
Note
1. We describe our approach in greater
detail in the accompanying W.E. Upjohn
Institute working paper (Lachowska et al.
2022). Our approach is related to work by
Caldwell and Harmon (2019), who examine
how wages are afected by changes in the
wages of former coworkers.
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Figure 2: How a 1 Percent Improvement in the Outside Option Afects Wages in the
Primary Job and the Likelihood of the Secondary Job Becoming the Primary Job,
by Industry
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hours on the primary job are essentially
fxed, a change in the primary-job
wage results in additional earnings
without a change in work efort—what
economists call an income efect. We
fnd that this income efect is similar
to those found in studies of individuals
winning lotteries.
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the secondary job becoming the primary job (vertical axis). The slope of the dashed, best-ft line is negative,
indicating that sectors in which primary job wages rise are less likely to result in separations.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Washington State wage records.
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Isolated States of America
State Borders, Mobility, and Labor Markets
Riley Wilson
Te United States has traditionally
been seen as a highly mobile country,
with nearly one in fve people changing
their county of residence every fve
years. Even though internal migration
has steadily declined over the past 40
years, the United States still exhibits
higher internal mobility than most

People are three times as likely to
move to a diferent county in the
same state as to move to an equally
distant county in a diferent state.
European countries (Molloy, Smith,
and Wozniak 2011). Geographic
mobility is ofen viewed as both
an opportunity for individuals to
fnd better job opportunities and a
mechanism through which places
adjust to economic change, both
positive (people move in) and negative
(people move out); both channels
contribute to labor market fuidity and
economic dynamism (Blanchard and
Katz 1992; Molloy et al. 2016).
However, local economic conditions
vary considerably across the country.
Most counties are within an hour’s
drive of another county that has higher

average wages, lower average house
prices, or both. Although there might
be other characteristics that ofset
these raw diferences, many individuals
could plausibly encounter better
employment or housing opportunities
a relatively short distance away, either
through migration or commuting.
Factors that reduce or limit this
internal migration or commuting could
depress economic growth.
In a related paper, I study a novel
aspect of U.S. internal migration and
commuting across counties. Drawing
on IRS data on county-to-county
migration and census data on countyto-county commuting, I show that,
even conditional on distance, crosscounty migration and commuting
drop signifcantly when a state border
lies between the two counties. People
are three times as likely to move to a
diferent county in the same state—
and about twice as likely to commute
to a diferent county in the same
state—as to move to an equally distant
county in a diferent state (see Figure
1, next page). In other words, state
borders reduce both residential and
employment mobility. Because there
are no legal or residency restrictions
associated with state borders (as there

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n County-to-county mobility drops significantly when counties are separated by state
borders.
n This drop is not driven by differences in local characteristics or in moving costs
related to state-level policy.
n State borders also affect county-to-county social connectedness (Facebook friendships), suggesting that personal ties, lack-of-information friction, or home-state
identity might be at play.
n Counties on state borders that face this migration stickiness have weaker recoveries
after cyclical downturns, such as the Great Recession.
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are with national borders), this pattern
is perhaps unexpected. Such migration
“frictions” could also shape the way
places respond to local economic
shocks.
Why State Borders Could Matter
Economists typically model the
decision to migrate as a choice between
locations based on the costs and
benefts associated with making the
move. An individual will move from
County A to County B if the net beneft
they get from County B over County
A exceeds the costs of moving there.
Tis simple framework suggests three
potential explanations for the drop in
mobility at state borders. First, local
characteristics that provide benefts
(e.g., good schools or transit options)
could discretely change at state borders,
leading to abrupt diferences in the
propensity to make such a move.
Second, state policies could impose
extra costs on cross-border moves (e.g.,
occupational licensing or higher taxes),
discouraging people from leaving the
state. Finally, the “connectedness” of
counties could fall across state lines.
For example, people might be hesitant
to switch to a new state if they have
fewer friends or family ties there, or
if their social networks provide less
information about circumstances there.
Local Characteristics Don’t Drive the
State Border Mobility Gap
If large diferences in benefts at
state borders were behind the mobility
gap, we would expect to see diferences
in local characteristics that people care
about, such as economic opportunities,
housing afordability, weather,
political attitudes, and local school
performance. However, this does not
appear to be the case. When I examine
the diference in several characteristics
between counties in the same state and
counties in an adjacent state, I do not
fnd any sudden jump to have occurred
as the distance between the two groups
shrinks. In other words, employment
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If state policies that caused higher
moving costs at state borders were
driving the mobility gap, we would
expect patterns to be asymmetric
across states. For example, if diferences
in state income taxes played a role,
there should be larger state border
migration penalties in moving from
low-tax to high-tax states, but smaller
migration penalties (or even bonuses)
in the reverse direction. Tis also does
not appear to be the case. Conditional
on distance, crossing state borders
is associated with a similar drop in
migration regardless of whether the
potential destination has higher or
lower taxes than the point of origin.
Tis pattern holds not just for taxes
(income, sales, or corporate), but
also for the generosity of several
state programs and policies (EITC,
Medicaid, TANF, school funding,
minimum wage) and the stringency of
occupational licensing.
Te Role of Social Connectedness
If diferences in local characteristics
and state policies don’t drive migration
gaps at state borders, diferences in
“social connectedness” across areas
might. Drawing upon the Social
Connectedness Index, which measures
Facebook friendship rates between
pairs of counties (Bailey et al. 2018),
I fnd a similar drop-of in county-tocounty friendship rates at state borders.
Conditional on distance, people have
about half as many Facebook friends

8
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State Policies Don’t Drive the State
Border Mobility Gap

Figure 1 Panel A: County-to-County Migration Rates
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Panel B: County-to-County Commuting Rates

50
Commuters per 1,000 people

rates, average wages, population,
demographic composition, industry
composition, housing prices, weather,
voting patterns, and school outcomes
are all similar across state borders.
Figure 1 shows that controlling for
these characteristics does not afect
the migration gap at state borders,
suggesting the drop in mobility there
is not driven by diferences in local
characteristics.
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NOTE: The circles show migration rates (Panel A) or commuting rates (Panel B) between pairs of counties,
aggregated by distance and whether the pairs are in the same or diferent states. They represent
statistical estimates that have been adjusted for diferences between county characteristics in each pair,
as detailed in the paper, and thus can be slightly negative. The horizontal axis indicates the distance in
miles between county-pair centers, where centers are population-weighted centroids.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using 2017 IRS SOI county-to-county fows and 2017 LEHD LODES.

across state lines as they do in counties
within the same state (see Figure 2).
It is challenging to determine
causality from this relationship, as
social networks could afect migration
but migration could also afect social
networks. Nonetheless, the correlation

is consistent with several potential
mechanisms. Individuals might face
large psychic costs when moving away
from friends and family. If individuals
have fewer friends across state borders,
psychic costs would be larger for
moves that cross state lines. Having
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fewer social connections across the
state border could also impede the
fow of information, leading to more
uncertainty and reducing people’s
willingness to change states.
A third factor that infuences both
cross-border social connectedness

Mobility drops at state borders,
even when controlling for detailed
local characteristics of origin and
destination counties.
and mobility could also be at play.
People might exhibit a behavioral
quirk known as the endowment efect,
in which it is especially costly to give
up things one is initially “endowed”
with. What would this look like in the
migration decision? Tis might show
up as a home state identity. People
identify with the state that they were
born in or grew up in, and it is thus
costly for them to consider moving
away. Unfortunately, few data sources
allow the exploration of this type of

mechanism. However, there are several
pieces of suggestive evidence. When
looking at the American Community
Survey, an annual survey of more than
one million U.S. households, movers
who were living in their state of birth
are less than half as likely to move out
of state as movers who were already
living outside their birth state. Using
data from a small survey on mobility
conducted by the Pew Research Center
in 2008, I fnd that 68 percent of
respondents say that they live in their
birth state because “they feel like they
belong [there]” or because their birth
state is the place they most identify
with. A large share of people thus
exhibit a birth-state identity, and in
the survey these individuals were less
likely to have ever moved out of state.
Interestingly, when asked hypothetical
questions about moving, individuals
who exhibit a birth-state identity are
less likely to report willingness to move
only if they are currently living in their
birth state. Tis is consistent with an
endowment efect, making it costly to
move away from one’s state of birth.

Scaled FB Friends per 1,000 people

Figure 2 County-to-County Facebook Friendship Rates Also Drop Of at State Borders, Even
When Distances Are Small
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Policy Implications: Does Tis
Pattern in Mobility Matter for Labor
Markets?
Regardless of why state borders
afect mobility, understanding how
this pattern infuences labor markets
has important policy implications.
Recent research fnds that places that
experienced larger downturns during
the Great Recession took longer to
recover economically and fell behind
less afected areas, even years later
(Hershbein and Stuart 2020). Building
on this work, I test to see whether this
pattern difers for counties at state
borders (where this mobility “friction”
is likely more binding) relative to
counties in the interior of the state
(see Figure 3). I fnd that the pattern
is stronger in border counties, where
recoveries from employment losses
occur even more slowly. Consistent
with the mobility pattern, border
counties also see lower in-migration
and in-commuting during the recovery
period, potentially limiting the
dynamism of these local economies.
Tese patterns in turn may help us
better understand the variation in
economic success and growth across
areas of the United States and highlight
why some places are slow to bounce
back from economic downturns. Tey
also are relevant for the evaluation
of social safety-net and place-based
policies, as migration frictions can
afect who stays, who comes in, and
how both afect the recovery path from
a local recession.
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Figure 3 Employment Recovery after the Great Recession Also Lags at State Borders
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separately for counties on state borders and those in the interior of the state.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2000–2017 Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.

New Book from the Upjohn Press
Intergenerational Mobility

How Gender, Race, and Family Structure Afect Adult Outcomes
Jean Kimmel, Editor
Recent studies point to a decline in intergenerational mobility due to weakening familial relationships
occurring mostly in poor or single-parent households or in households of color. In addition, linkages between
declining rates of marriage and labor market participation are exacerbating inequality particularly, it is
thought, among males raised in single-parent households. This volume presents a complex portrait of the
interrelationships among parents’ marital status and education, child gender, and the nature and success of
children’s transitions into adulthood. The frst three chapters focus on diferences in parents’ investments in
their children, while the fnal three chapters focus directly on intergenerational income mobility. Contributors
include Rachel Connelly and Jean Kimmel, Ariel Kalil and Susan Mayer, Michael Baker, Sarah Kroeger, Bhashkar
Mazumber, and Paula Fomby.
256 pp. 2021 $20 paper 978-088099-678-5
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